KMT Rise and fall/ Domestic Policy

Prior 1919

Arguably since the KMT was never in power, there was no formal rule of the KMT to strenuously enforce its ideology of the Three People’s Principles. Despite the new Provisional government was ruled under the three branches, five yuan system, due to Yuan Shi Kai’s abuse.

Henceforth there isn’t any formal or solid domestic nor foreign policy enforced during the period of time.

1919-1925 – Sun Yet Sen’s Rule/ Soviet-KMT-CCP United Front

Sun-Jeffo Manifesto/ Soviet-KMT-CCP United Front

The Sun Jeffo Manifesto was part of the party organization in 1924. Sun Yet sen, seeing a lack of organization and unity within the KMT, with his members disobedient and cooperating very little since 1912, considered the Lenin revolution a model for the KMT’s future. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party had the support of the lower class including the farmers and workers, including both from the rural and urban areas. Lastly to gain foreign support, the Soviet Union originally was not interested in supporting him, rather actually approaching the warlord government over him, threatening his power. Hence Sun urged the adoption of CCP members to join into the KMT ranks individually, but not as a bloc.

After meeting with a Comintern (Communist International) agent H. Maring in Spring of 1921, Sun was able to influence a new meeting into forming a bloc called the Soviet-KMT-CCP Cooperation, which influenced the CCP Central Commitee to permit individual Communists to enter the KMT. Shortly after the Comintern dispatched Adolf Joffe to work on a cooperation, who was received by the New Tide Society much to the displeasure of the Peking (Warlord) Government and foreign ambassadors. Approved by 53 KMT leaders at a Shanghai conference on 4th September, 1922, it became the new principle of the KMT, reorganization was appointed to Chen Tu-hsiu as well as Hu Han Min.

Later the 12th January, 1923, the CCP was instructed by the Soviets to enter the Nationalist party. Despite reluctance, the CCP entered the KMT individually and agreed to accept the order and rules of the KMT. Publicly, the CCP acknolwedged the KMT as the leader and National Revolution and to partake in Sun’s “Bourgeois democratic revolution”.

With the CCP in line, the Sun Joffe negotiation came to a joint Manifesto on 26th January, 1923, which covered four major big points:

1. It is not possible to carry out Communism or the Soviet system in China at present
2. The Soviet government reaffirms its earlier announcement of 27th September, 1920 (Regarding the social rights and privileges in China)
3. A mutual understanding is reached with regard to the future administration and reorganization of the Chinese Eastern Railway
4. The Soviets disavow any imperialistic intentions or policies in Outer Mongolia

To explore the benefits to the KMT on this manifesto, the first point firstly allowed Sun to obtain aid as well as sending his protege Chang Kai Shek, to a military academy in Russia and learn about the discipline and indoctrination of the Red Army. This was specifically crucial as it was due to this training that the Whompoa Academy was found later, which trained the KMT’s elite commanders. Secondly the third and forth points are clear responses to the Japanese 21 demands, including the railway lease towards the Japanese as well as the Japanese occupation of Shangdong and inner Mongolia.’

Impacts

The merge of the KMT and CCP was merely a marriage of convenience. Both sides needed each other but distrusted each other completely. The KMT needed the lower class support and military aid while the Soviets needed a power base in China. One of the KMT leaders Li Ta-chao made a public declaration to the party that KMT shall and will devote themselves fully just as the revolution, without the interference of any Communist bloc. On the other hand, the Soviets were in desperate need of a power base, the KMT was a successful stepping stone to power. They had planned to slowly influence and squeeze at the rightists within the KMT by importing young, new CCP members into the KMT.

However, one should understand that even without collaboration, the KMT had a massive split between left right between Wang Jing-Wei and Hu Han-Min respectively. The CCP enrollment was a mere catalyst to exacerbate the situation as half the party sympathized with them whereas the other distrusted them completely. Despite the agreement was that no bloc would be form within the CCP’s KMT membership, the allowance of double membership created identities and groups within the KMT to differentiate each other. Furthermore, the CCP still retained its own headquarters and Central Committee, which led to contradicting orders in later parts of the revolution. This would later cause a massive split in the KMT government as well as the eradication of the communists in China.

But regardless of its later outcome, in the short term Sun had acquired support from a power that allowed him to develop and defeat the Pei Ping (Warlord) Government, which led to the planning of the North expedition.

1926-1928 – Chang Kai Shek, Nanking Government and the purge of the communists

Northern Expedition

The North Expedition, originally a concept by Sun Yet sen, was never conducted due to his death 12th March, 1925. Despite splits between the left and right, in the middle stood Chiang ai Shek, who was the superintendent of the Whompoa Military Academy, which remained the prominent army training camp for officers and skilled soldiers.

Following numerous regroups, the Nationalist Goverment officially set up in Canton to rival the Peking Warlord government. Simply the campaign was a long march from south to north and eliminating the resistance from the Warlord government.

The campaign began 1st July, 1925, aiming to take out Wu Pei Fu, Chang Tso-Lin and Sun Chuan fang. The North expedition was essentially a blitzkrieg, with the aid from the soviet supplies and the CCP instigated revolts within cities through the channels between workers and peasants. Within nine months half of China was conquered.

Purge of the Communists

On 15th May, 1926 the KMT central executive committee passed nine resolutions to limit the communists to no more than a third of all committee memberships, excluding them from department directorships in the party headquarters and prevention of any KMT members from accepting Communist members.

With the Northern Expedition at the brink of success, an assassination was made against Liao Chung Kai, a prominent leader of the Central Politics Meeting within the KMT. A paranoid, distrustful Chiang and his allies immediately called for a KMT Executive meeting , where they decided to expel the Communists from the KMT and dismiss Borodin, the Soviet ambassador to China. Prior though, there were other factors that contributed to Chiang’s paranoia. The Warship Cheungshan incident happened 20th March, 1926, with a rogue a rogue captain under the influence of Communism, decided to kidnap Cheng Kai Shek. It failed miserably but led to a mass dismissal of advisors, soldiers, commanders, party representatives from the Soviet and CCP bloc within the First Army.

Following this, the Northern Expedition resumed with a new wave, now even attacking CCP majority cities. Chiang was easily building a power base in Eastern and Southeastern China. With Nanking and Shanghai safely in his hands, Chiang set up a new government in Wuhan, now turning into a triangular rivalry between Canton (Left KMT), Wuhan (Chiang/ Right KMT) and the Warlord government. This led to the “Second Northern Expedition”, which Borodin and Wang Jin Wei’s WuHan government led a new campaign to this time wipe out the Wuhan government too. However Borodin’s generals  Feng Yu Hsang and Yen Hsi-San soon rebelled because the WuHan government to them was essentially a CCP government. The generals then proposed to Chiang for a joint expedition to eradicate the communist threat. A conference was held and was concluded with Feng’s public demand that the WuHan Government to expel Borodin and the Communists.

Simultaneously, Stalin who was pressured with his political control, demanded Borodin to transform the WuHan Government into a Soviet Puppetry regime. However realizing the impossibility of the orders, Borodin’s men presented Wang Jing Wei with the telegram to reveal Stalin’s true intention. Wang subsequently decided to hold a conference the mediate with Chiang. In response Borodin set up a new government and initiated a new offensive against the WuHan Government. Wang retaliated by condemning all CCP members for violating Nationalist policy. Soon after in 26th July the WuHan presidium decided to oust all CCP members within the WuHan government. Borodin subsequently left one day after.

The WuHan/ Nanking split and unification

With the CCP liquidated after one final coup de grace in NanChang 1st August, Wang and Chiang’s government reopened negotiations to combine the governments in order to prevent anymore unnecessary conflict. A conference was held in Shanghai shortly after the liquidation. Ultimately, the WuHan government was to move into the Nanking government, with Chiang once again newly reinstated as the commander in chief of the National Revolutionary Army.

Now a unified KMT could fight against the Warlord Government, who had nowhere to run due to the Japanese occupation of Shandong. The KMT quickly routed the enemy and occupied PeiPing, where it was renamed Peking. The Warlord government were killed in a train explosion that was rigged by the Japanese.

By 1929, it signified a year of prosperity for the KMT, having unified China, consolidated its internal power and unity. Mostly important after thirteen years of civil war China would be unified for the next ten years.

1928-1937 – Nanking Decade/ Chang Kai Shek’s rule

Unification of China/ Post Expedition

Following the Northern Expedition, most people would agree by 1928 the Chinese KMT had almost completely unified China. However pockets of resistance still loomed, such as splinter warlords and splinter CCP militants still walked safely among the country. Despite the CCP’s lack of retaliation, China was hardly secure. This was first followed by the the adoption of the “New Warlords”, who were essentially warlords that semi-independent but under the KMT government ideologically.

However the warlords still possessed massive army strength that were splintered in different locations by different warlords. When the KMT’s Third National Congress came in March 1929, Chiang called for the reduction of all troops, as well as unifying all splinter military forces under the National Revolutionary Army. The New Warlords refused and instead counterproposed that Chiang should cut down his NRA. Both sides entered a stalemate.

On the other hand, the triumvirate within the KMT was collapsing. Chiang did well to ally himself with Hu Han Min and eliminated or expelled a significant number of Left Wing KMT to weaken Wang Jing Wei. Following the KMT-CCP split, the KMT was effective by now a right wing group, with Hu Han Min safely assigned as the head of the Legislative Branch.

Simultaneously, the congress also officially announced the start of the second stage of Political Tutelage from Sun Yet sen’s Three Stages of Revolution (Read Ideologies: Three Stages of Revolution). With Wang’s left wing setting up government in Canton and facing hostile public opinion, Chiang had managed to combine the governments into the Nanking Government. However more sparks flew as Hu Han Min, Chiang’s reliant ally turned against him in 1931, voicing concern that his position of being both premier and president was extremely dangerous. Subsequently Hu was placed under house arrest but released later due to public pressure.

The KMT had also initiated five military campaigns between 1930-1934 to completely route the CCP army. Chiang, who had outnumbered the CCP significantly, took five tries before successfully routing the enemy and initiated the Long March, a great retreat of the CCP.

In conclusion, not only the KMT was faced with foreign aggression and rivalry, but also confronted by internal struggles to unify its ideologies.

Domestic Policy

The Nationalist Government struggled hard to achieve any sort of real reform during the decade, and it subsequently lost substantial support from the people. However, one cannot fully attribute the blame completely on the Nationalist Government, as much as they did strife to follow Sun’s Three people’s Principles.

Firstly the Nationalist Government had a great financial reform by nationalizing its new currency “Silver dollar” or “Yuan”, which solved the initial problem of the confusions between the “yuan” and tael” which was introduced in 1914. Also the currency was plagued by the rising price of its currency, causing a major inflation and decline in stock market. With the nationalization of silver and introduction of paper money, through the distribution by the four national banks at that time. With the money flow unified, as well as its distribution completely controlled by the government, it can be concluded by 1935 in Chinese history the foreign exchange rate was under government controlled through the banks.

Secondly on a simultaneous political and economic scale, the Nationalist Government was well ahead to declare its abolishment of treaties and enter renegotiation. Through these channels China firstly had abolished its 5 percent tariff to external influences, also that under principle the Western Powers recognized China’s autonomy and to give up on their consular jurisdiction. With her own autonomy, the Nationalists were successful to push the British and Belgian military and economic concessions in provinces including Hakow, Kiukiang and Amoy etc. However despite a big step taken to install the autonomous identity for China, the KMT would not triumph till 1943 when the UNited States and Britain declared the abolishment of unequal treaties in China.

As for its own domestic development, the Nationalist Government spent much money on improving the transport and communication between provinces, this included increase of railway mileage, setting up ferry systems in the east as well as high way constructions. During the Nanking decade the railway range increased from 8,000 kilometres to 13,000 kilometres, and the highway network spanned 115,703 kilometres comparing to 1,000 in 1921. Also the Nationalist Government was successful in stepping an aviation industry, with the inception of the China National Aviation Cooperation with the help of American Capital that connected major cities including Nanking, Shanghai, Beijing and Canton.

Despite the blow on the loss of Manchuria and damages to her most important port Shanghai, the Nationalist Government continued its own industrial development, with a total importation of industrial equipment reaching CH$500 Million. This accounts for the ultimate breakthrough from a peasantry into the first step to industrializing the entire country. Good progresses were made in cotton, flour, matches and chemical manufacturing.

Education also took a great progression, with the Ministry of Education made a reform by firstly combining public universities colleges and other schools into thirteen national universities, five technical colleges and nine provincial colleges. New professors and equipment were imported. By 1937 there were 2042 middle schools, 1211 normal schools and 370 professional schools, and with a total enrollment of 545,207 students. Most notably would be the New Life movement (read Ideologies: The New Life Movement) , attempting to discipline the mentality of the Chinese people by reintroducing traditional values. Despite its successes in disciplining its people militaristically to some extent, this was an obvious split with the CCP ideology and did little to help the 1934-1937 United Front.

However with so many improvements to increase the basis of its people, the Nationalist Government had neglected the single aspect that had brought down many other civilizations: Landlordism. China was no different to any country that were not industrialized. Made up of 80% peasants within its peasants this was an obvious problem that was prone to topple the government. The peasants had long lived in suffering and misery. A study by the League of Nations revealed that tenants occupied 60-90% of Southern China, and they were required to pay at least 60% of their earnings as rental plus land tax and surtax. The Nationalist Government’s advocacy was that it needed “a quick victory and unify the country”. Negotiations with the Warlord governments were made through offering them land to own and prosper by themselves to gain their support. This was imperative due to foreign influences that were still constantly threatening the stability of China. In reality however, welfare of the masses were the least of concerns for the warlords and most KMT generals and officials anyway, they were not all anxious to change the rotten core of its domestic system at that time. After all as mentioned before, the KMT was the basis of gentry and middle-class men. Subsequently the people were more prone to support the CCP, which was entirely the basis for them: The suffering lower class.

Fiscal units were a connecting point to the land taxes, since the Nationalist government was no keen to reform its own economic system, hence most of its income came from provincial taxes, custom revenues and commercial taxes. Since 68% of its income came from the coastal areas where commercial taxes were lucrative, again reinforcing on the point why there was apathetic reactions to change. However reliance on coastal trading only provided 80% of what the government needed to militarize and industrialize. The government placed a heavy emphasis on deficit spending and increase issues of its currency, leading to a inflation issues during its conflicts.

Conclusion:

Overall, the supposing peaceful Nanking Decade of prosperity were mostly looked upon by Historians as “Strong on the outside, weak on the inside (外強中乾)”. To a certain extent the Nationalist Government was successful in drumming up military discipline as well as Sun’s cult of personality through the New Life Movement. However the Nationalist Government had not made any real attempt to improve the economic situation of the people’s livelihood, and rather readily sacrificed them to National Industrialization, Warlords and landlords to proliferate the power base of the KMT.

Most importantly, the economic and intellectualism movements were a clear betrayal to Sun’s Three People’s Principles (read Ideologies: Three People’s Principles). Despite Chang was attempting to build on its first point of Nationalism through Sun’s cult, it is clear that he had no intent on following Sun’s policies or ideologies, especially the reluctance to ally with the CCP till the Japanese were at China’s doorstep. The CCP had mass support through its people, and army’s weariness of conflict over so many years since the Boxer Rebellion was an obstacle much subjected into the CCP’s weaponry against the strict, militaristic discipline of the New Army. Therefore the Nanking Decade can from one end seen as a temporary consolidation of power of the Nationalist Government, however it is clear that it was ineffective to combat the foreign aggression nor its internal instability, thus the period was a mere time bomb that would spark another torrent of civil war.

1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War/ Reorganized National Government/ Wang Jingwei’s Regime/ Eight Years of Resistance

Sino-Japanese War

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War was something that was unavoidable to start with, having despaired from the Great Depression and Japanese Political instability in the 1930s, Japanese aggression had already begun in 1931 starting with the Manchurian incident (Read External Influences/ Foreign Policy: Sino-Japanese War).

This period of time was a new low to the political control of the KMT, knowing its own lacking of power to resist a new torrent of militaristic threat. Having faced with more autonomous movements initiated by Japan a few provinces were economically under control by Japan.

Chiang’s policy was simple: stall. He had evacuated Peiyang (Peking/Beijing) earlier as well as moving the capital to Chungking quickly, leaving the citizens behind. In practical terms Chiang was abandoning most of the key cities of China while using his armies to stall the Japanese advance. Within the first phase of invasion, Peiyang, Shanghai and Nanking had all been conquered and occupied under the installation of puppet governments by the Japanese.

However, China was arguably unified under a shroud of hope and deception. Despite Mao expressed his support in the “Together WE Confront the National Crisis” that on the surface agreed to the KMT’s rule, in reality Chang never trusted the CCP. Chang remained an army in the Northwest to blockade the CCP incase of a new spread of civil war. His worries were not of all illogical, seeing a growing army that regrouped to 80,000 men. Clandestinely, Mao made it very clear that the CCP should remain 70% expansion, 20 % dealing with the KMT and 10% to resist the Japanese. Movements known as the Yenan period allowed Mao to infiltrate the mainlands of China in the creation of organizations and groups which based their support from the people. This would call out a new wave of media attention to visit the CCP and allow its ideas to spread globally that compared Mao’s regime to the KMT.

Resistance and control

On the other hand, the outbreak of the Japanese Invasion marked an upsurge of Nationalism to unify and resist the Japanese. However local resistance was not enough to topple the enemy, as the continuous installation of puppet governments effectively brought the citizens under control. The rape of Nanjing struck enough fear within the Chinese citizenry to not revolt too vehemently. Regardless, the Japanese still had not controlled the Chinese mainlands, seeing their campaign as a short-term conquest to occupy China, they instead only succeeded acquiring around 70% of Eastern China, to consolidate itself, they only hastily brought key prominent figures into Inner Mongolia and Peiyang.

This would all be changed when Wang Jing Wei came into the picture. Wang having complete belief on defeatism, offered himself as to rule all over the Chinese Mainlands through puppetry.  His concerns were not all that poor and cynical, but could be interpreted as to focus on the welfare of the Chinese Citizenry within occupied China. One could analyze his intentions was that firstly with his power he could protect the Chinese citizens from Japanese atrocities, and secondly should China really be defeated by the Japanese Invaders Chang couldn’t do a better job anyway. Or from a simple sinister point of view simply Wang had been jealous of Chiang’s power after the Nanking Decade. But in conclusion Wang’s installation was brought by serious refute from the KMT and western powers, his government was never fully recognized by anyone aside from the Axis powers. This would also bring an upsurge of Anti-Japanese hatred as well what as known as the Hanjians (漢奸).

Endwar

The war’s progression, events and end had a series of effects on Chiang and his government. Firstly the American support had weakened, shown by much of Chiang strong tactics to attempt to suppress the CCP through force, whereas the American media and public called for sympathizing tactics that to maintain inner peace. Most importantly significant American Media were impressed by the CCP, who were convinced these “communists” were the real “democracy” for China. This was a shift of table and weakened the resolve Chiang had grasped and censored prior to the war.

Secondly, with the outbreak of war the new CCP now under Mao had emerged as a unified power that infiltrated cities to spread its ideology. If not for the war Chiang would have irrefutably completely crushed the CCP, seeing that they were surrounded and rallied in the North-Western mountain ranges, where its bulwark had been crushed or ambushed passing KMT troops anyway. The break allowed Mao to recruit his new force of civilians and soldiers alike to support the CCP movement while the KMT busied themselves to fight the war. Rural areas became a powerbase of the CCP with its sulf-sufficiency tactic to engage with villages and befriended, including interaction with intellects, peasants and workers. With policies that were much more lenient to the peasants, the CCP had gained a big enough powerbase to infiltrate cities through the means of manpower.

Thirdly, the KMT soldiers by now were extremely weary of war. Having fought since 1924 of constant conflict against the Warlords, the CCP and then the Japanese. The KMT was completely worn out from its state, with some of its best German trained army destroyed and old comrades who were dead after long years of revolution. By now the KMT’s military force were tired, only meaning a possible CCP opportunity to raise hell.

Fourthly, Chiang’s domestic policy had never been popular, neglecting the beneficial of the people, rather instead called for a political tutelage phase that based even strongly on discipline. The swift defeat (From a Chinese Perspective) was a blow to the KMT’s image, seeing them as weak and unable to fulfill the its role they set up to be: A strong, nationalistic China that could withstand and eradicate any foreign or alien influence. Instead, Chiang gave up his commanding role of the army to the Americans and relied wholly on their support during the course of the war. Overall however, most importantly Chiang’s citizens were discourse and displeased with the sufferings over the war.

In conclusion, the war not only crippled Chiang’s government, but had damaged his army so severely that it could not last another war. Also the war became 8 years where the CCP was able to regroup and militarize itself through ideology and recruitment schemes that consolidated their position in China.

1945-1949 Chiang’s New Regime/ Fall of the KMT

An unexpected surprise

With the war ending so abruptly (following the atomic shock), Chiang was facing serious manpower and economic problems. Firstly the war costs had increased by 10000% from 1937-1945, and by the end of the war the debt of the Chinese government was 1,464 billion. The debt however as aforementioned before had been acquired since 1928 with huge deficit spending. This was exacerbated during the war, with China’s key ports being occupied and war expenditure still increasing based on foreign loans. The obvious solution was to print more money bills which led to a hyper-inflation for China. It ruined citizen’s lives, the middle class lost their capital. The KMT were once again placed on the blame for their act again.

Moreover, the end of the Japanese occupation only meant lands that were left out in the open. This meant an opportunity for the CCP to quickly occupy these territories and seize any Japanese arms they could obtain in raids. With their slight geographical advantage, the CCP managed to occupy key Chinese territories including Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow and Canton. Within two weeks after the end of the war, the CCP had increased their territories from 116 to 175 counties.

Luckily, with American support the KMT managed to retake such territories (Read KMT Rise and Fall/ Domestic Policies: United States of America)

Regardless of what previous policy, agreement there was the KMT and CCP were effectively at war by the end of WWII. To attempt negotiations, the Americans under General Marshall mediated a meeting, where Mao and Chiang were able to meet. The meeting was a success to Mao, since the KMT were placed in a difficult position based on Western calls for peace and the lack of public support from its citizenry. While Mao appeared to be conciliatory, Chiang remained a strong position, intending to keep his position and suppress the CCP. He had experienced eight years of war and was not willing to share the victories of war with his enemy. With the American neutrality, Chiang refused to accept a modus vivendi based on Mao’s proposal, which would ended the CCP aggression to some extent while giving them legal status. The outcome of the meeting however, came the establishment of the PCC (Political Consultative Council) where a joint political power between the KMT and CCP were set up, with 38 members that based off some rules of engagement between the two parties.

However being plagued with other issues including Manchuria, Chiang had considerable problems securing China using the already damaged KMT army. The strength balance remained at 5:1, but the external occupation of Manchuria proved to be a critical problem. The Soviets under Stalin had not pulled out of Manchuria after three as they had promised, rather they had looted all industrial equipment and moved it back to Soviet Russia to support its own industrialization program. To counter this Chiang sent half a million of his best troops, while leaving the Chinese mainlands empty. Sure enough the KMT regained Manchuria when the Soviet Forces officially pulled out in May 1946, but it left a pocket where the CCP had its critical chance to seize more land and outnumber KMT forces in certain areas.

Aggression to war

Seeing the stalemate the American support was giving China, the CCP initiated an attack on Manchuria April 1946, taking the key city Changchun. They then proposed a revision to balance the armed forces ratio between the CCP and KMT. Enraged, Chiang vindicated an all out war on the communists in order to secure China once and for all. He believed the impractical, romantic dream of coalition government between the KMT and CCP would be destroyed. Seeing that there was no way the Americans ultimately would allow the KMT to be destroyed, despite the Americans had explicitly stated that they would not underwrite a civil war should Chiang decided to initiate aggression.

Chiang initiated invasion in mid-1946, where the impetuous KMT forces captured over 165 towns and 174,000 square kilometers within half a year. By March 1947 they even managed to capture Yenan, which had the capital and powerbase of the CCP since Mao’s rise to power. Chiang see an imminent victory, confident it would be another three or four months before the KMT would completely destroy the CCP. With a strong militaristic success, Chiang also initiated political movements, first by calling the National Assembly to adopt a new constitution which reaffirmed the Three People’s Principles and the 5 yuan system. However many changes were made since Sun Yet Sen’s writing, including a veto system where the President of the Republic could overrule the Legislative Yuan. Despite a few alterations, effectively Chiang was elected as President of the Republic on 19th April 1948, signifying the final stage of constitutional democracy for the ROC

However this would all change soon. The retreating CCP army (People’s Liberation Army) was continuing to grow steady, having its new found militia and recruits that were trained slowly in the background during WWII. By June the CCP reached 1.95 million with KMT’s 3.73 million. As insignificant as it sounds by looking at only this statistic, by November of 1948 the CCP managed to exceed the KMT numbers with 3 million vs 2.9 million. In basic context, the KMT fighting force was reduced during the course of the war to garrison occupied cities. The splintered army was now being outnumbered by a central, well planned PLA who sought to initiate a counter-attack. By the end of the 1947, the CCP were regaining their land with in Honan and Hopeh.

But perhaps the most severe blow was Manchuria, where Chiang’s most elite forces lay, half a million in strength. It was an enclosed, untenable position that Chiang obstinately held on to. By the end of 1948, the KMT’s most elite army was completely routed from Manchuria and destroyed, with 470,000 of Chiang’s best troops gone.

The counterattack

With Manchuria safely in CCP hands, and the PLA outnumbering the National Revolution Army under Chiang, Mao safely initiated three new military campaigns that marked the beginning of the end of the KMT. The CCP initiated attacks on Huai-Hai, Pingjin and Liaoshen where a total of 1.5 million people were lost within 2 weeks. By now the KMT foresaw their own defeat with their occupied territories taken out in weeks. By June 1949 the CCP had 4 million troops while only 1.5 million remained for the KMT. Surrenders were so fast that entire armies were swallowed by the PLA who need not invasion to win.

By 21st January, 1949, Chiang resigned as party leader while Vice-President Li tsung-jen attempted to continue the resistance. Negotiations were initiated but with such a clear polarized power balance, the CCP did not need any negotiations to the same party who suppressed them brutally for 20 years. Even without conquering the entire mainland, Mao decided to pronounce the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on 1st October, 1949. By December, the refugee government fled to the Taiwan, signifying the end of a 37 year struggle of unification.

Conclusion of the Civil War

The KMT’s failure cannot single handedly placed on Chiang’s own aggression and xenophobic behavior against the CCP since 1926. The key event was the Sino-Japanese War which opened a large opportunity for the CCP to 1) Expand its military forces and sending delegates to communicate with the Chinese around the Yenan region 2) Rest and recruit more militia following the big defeat during the Long March 3) allowed them to place the blame of the KMT for 8 years of struggle that made its citizens suffer considerably.

On the other hand, the WWII had drained the KMT considerably, including 1) its military forces reduced by 4.7 million, also the critical moral lost and weariness to start another war after 8 years of struggle 2) The inflation caused by the war had increased food prices by over 30%, causing civil rampage 3) The debt China owned were compensated by printing bills, which increased the issues of notes by 4,524 times. Small businesses and the peasantry suffered significantly during this period and placed the blame wholly on the KMT. 4) The Nationalist Officials when reoccupying the Japanese-conquered areas, did extremely poor to help its citizenry. In order to reconvert to the “Fapi” currency that was issued by the Japanese Puppet Government,  they had announced a new conversation rate of 200 to 1. Compared to the originally conversion to Fapi during the Japanese occupation was 2 to 1, in other words the people of China had reduced their savings by 400 times due to the government insensibility.

Regardless, if the Japanese did not increase their aggression that started from 1931, China would have been in a very different position. Firstly, the Long March would have been suppressed even more forceful should Chiang had more troops that could focus in the Northern parts of China. Instead he was forced to garrison some of his elite troops in the east to the counter the Japanese aggression. If not for the war the KMT would have not allowed the CCP to regroup and expand, rather its prodigiously huge army would have easily crushed the PLA that was at a bare number of 100,000 men.

On Chiang’s part, his extreme confidence that he could easily defeat the CCP was his key mistake. He was too eager to initiate a war and over-confident that his victories would continue wave by wave, neglecting the citizenry’s suffering and unwillingness to continue fighting. Fundamentally, as mentioned as part of the domestic policy during the Nanjing decade, the Nationalist government never solved its taxation, revenue and landlord policy which sparked incredible hatred from the peasant that took a dominant size of China’s population. Whereas Mao was effective in supporting these peasantries, having constant communication and amiable approaches during his regime.

In conclusion, the KMT fell due to its over confidence, having drained of its economic power and political power. Its ostensible control and might was crushed by foreign influences including a failed American supportive stance and a Japanese invasion. The KMT did not achieve greatness to improve the livelihood of its citizenry throughout its rule, though understandable in certain cases, however its fundamental laws were no better than the dynasty rule and created mass suffering for its lower-class citizens.